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I. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of WorldCom, Inc., exposed a complex web of
accounting irregularities.' Within that web, recent filings by Dick
Thornburgh, WorldCom's Bankruptcy Court Examiner, reveal a
different type of scheme that involves the holding of intellectual
property.2 Further scrutinizing the scheme reveals that WorldCom
and its tax advisors, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (KPMG), devised a
tax avoidance scheme through the creation of an intellectual
property holding company (IP holding company).3 This type of
scheme has been widely and quietly utilized in the last twenty years
by many corporations with substantial intellectual property.4
Indeed, as state taxing authorities have become more aggressive
in their auditing process, the spotlight is now on the IP holding
company scheme. Due to numerous states' slow recovery from the
economic downturn and the shrinkage of state tax revenues in the
last few years,5 more and more states have directed their attention
' See John C. Coffee, Jr., GatekeeperFailureand Reform: The Challengeof Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301,302 (2004) (noting epidemic of accounting and related
financial irregularities at companies, notably Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco).
2 See generally Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court
Examiner, In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 2004 WL 353878 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004)
(describing WorldCom's state minimizing tax program under advice of KPMG).
3 The Bankruptcy Examiner in the WorldCom case asserted that due to KPMG's advice
WorldCom may have potential claims against KPMG for being negligent in proposing the
"highly aggressive intangible asset royalty programs" and for failure to warn WorldCom that
"certain of [KPMG's] conclusions were highly aggressive and subject to challenge,"
particularly in light of KPMG's engagement letter with WorldCom in which KPMG "agreed
to return fees it received if its tax advice proved incorrect." Id. at III.A.
' See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r, 778 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Mass. 2002) (giving
minutes of Jan. 23, 1991, board meeting, which provides reasons for creating subsidiaries);
Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, [N.M.) St. Tax Rep. (CCH) %401-004,21,176
(N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 27,2001), writ granted,40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002) (table case); In re Toys
"R" Us-NYTEX, Inc., No. TAT(E) 93-1039 (GC), 2004 WL 75386 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Jan. 14,
2004) (discussing Toys "R" Us and its holding company); In re Addax Music Co., No. 28376
TSB-H-85(1)C, 1984 WL 179619 (N.Y. Dep't Tax. & Fin. Dec. 14, 1984) (describing Addax as
subsidiary of Paramount Pictures and Gulf& Western Industries, Inc., which has no assets
except music copyrights and no income except royalties earned on such copyrights); Sec'y of
Revenue v. A & F Trademark, Inc., [2 N.C.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 202-146, 11,041 (N.C. Tax
Review Bd. May 7, 2002).
' According to the Multistate Tax Commission, which represents several state revenue
agencies, the state income tax rate for corporations for 2002 was 5.2% compared to 9.6% in
1980. See Deborah Diehl, Is the IP Holding Company Dead?, 37 MD. B.J. 43, 44 (2004)
(discussing shrinkage of state tax revenue in recent years, how shrinkage functions as factor
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to intercorporate transactions and income shifting schemes. In
doing so, many states unearthed handsome amounts of royalty
income generated by the licensing of intellectual property that had
never been taxed. Utilizing this taxing power, states are eager to
reach the royalty income accumulated by companies holding
intellectual property, but in taxing such income, states may
encounter a potential constitutional stumbling block.
How does intellectual property become part of a tax avoidance
scheme? What is an IP holding company? What are the tax and
nontax reasons that facilitate the creation of this scheme? What are
the constitutional challenges states may face in their efforts to tax
royalty income? What are their alternatives?
This Article will address these questions and argue that the IP
holding company scheme is a complex tax avoidance program
requiring states to devise an approach to taxation that reflects an
understanding of intellectual property rights and of the interests of
intellectual property rights holders. In and of itself, a scheme that
results in tax avoidance is not illegal. There are considerable
business reasons behind the creation of an IP holding company for
a major corporation's intellectual property assets. Part I discusses
the transformation of intellectual property into valuable corporate
assets.
Part II identifies and analyzes the IP holding company scheme.
Notable examples illustrate the widespread use of this scheme by
major U.S. corporations.
Part III focuses on the constitutional reach of state taxing power
to royalty income received by out-of-state holding companies in light
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.'
Part IV discusses how states attempted to evade constitutional
requirements in their eagerness to tax the royalty income of out-ofstate holding companies. This section analyzes the business situs
approach to intellectual property rights as employed by states to
justify their fulfillment of the constitutional requirements post-

along "with the budget pressures many states are currently experiencing, and the recognition
by the states of the 'income shifting from the use of intellectual property holding companies").
6 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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Quill. This section critiques the business situs approach by
providing illustrative examples of how the approach reaches beyond
constitutional limits.
Part V advocates balancing the interests between states and
holders of intellectual property. This section highlights some
fundamental aspects of intellectual property rights that may assist
states in their efforts to reach royalty income received by out-ofstate holding companies that license intellectual property rights for
use within states. This section also provides alternative approaches
states may consider that pose less risk of constitutional challenges.
This Article concludes that as long as intellectual property assets
are valuable corporate assets and holders of intellectual property
continue to seek ways to maximize their return on such assets,
uncertainties regarding states' power to tax an IP holding company's
income reflect a need for guidance from Congress and a need for
uniformity of state tax treatments. Regardless of these uncertainties, the potential migration of intellectual property assets offshore
poses yet another problem.
II. THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS
Rapid change in science and technology, coupled with expansion
of legal protection,7 has created a new type of valuable intangible
corporate asset.' That asset is intellectual property, which often
includes patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and trademarks.9
Although the existence of various forms of intellectual property can

' The expansion of legal protection for intangible property is evidenced by the
recognition of patent protection in the biotech, computer software, and Internet industries.
s See Joseph M. Manak, The Law of Written Description in Pharmaceuticaland
Biotechnology Patents, 23 BIOTECH. L. REP. 30, 31 (2004) ("[I]ntellectual property is in a
constant state of boundless growth. It can arise at any time by virtue of almost any new
creation or invention from any of the billions ofminds on the planet engaged in multitudinous
endeavors."); Richard G. Mason & Beth M. Polebaum, Buying Intellectual Property from
Troubled Companies, 779 PLI/PAT 365, 373 (2004) ("In today's economy, a company's
intellectual property may be among its most valuable assets.").
' See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183,
200 (2004) (noting "widespread consensus that intellectual property rights have become
increasingly valuable since the 1970s"); Sherry Lynn Murphy, Unlimited CongressionalPower
Under the Copyright Clause in Article I of the Constitution: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 38 U.S.F. L.
REv. 525, 531-33 (2004) (providing brief discussion of types of intellectual property).
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be traced to antiquity, ° the impact of intellectual property on the
economy, workplace,"
culture, society, and daily life is a more
12
recent phenomenon.

The globalization of commerce has facilitated the movement of
goods, including patented, copyrighted, and trademarked goods, to
all corners of the world." Indeed, the monetary value of copyrighted
goods exported from the United States to other countries has led all
other exported goods.' 4 Moreover, the emergence of digital technology and the Internet has transformed the protection and dissemina10The

history of various forms of intellectual property is rich. Trade secrets and legal

protection against misappropriation of trade secrets have been traced to the Roman Empire.
A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti,30 COLuM.
L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1930) (arguing that action available in response to third party enticing
slave-employee to disclose business secrets demonstrates that Roman law protected
intellectual property). The earliest mention of a patent protection system is in Aristotle's The
Politics. See Aristotle, THE POLITICS 36-39 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (discussing law of Hippodamus "that those who discovered anything for the good of the
state should be honoured"). Copyright protection emerged from the introduction of the
printing press in England. See Shubha Ghosh, DeprivatizingCopyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 387, 429 (2003) (detailing connection between printing press technology and emergence
of copyright protection). The use of trademarks in commerce is also traced to antiquity. See
generally Sidney A. Diamond, The HistoricalDevelopment of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK
REP. 265 (1975) (surveying history of trademark); F.D. Prager, The Early Growth and
Influence ofIntellectualProperty,34 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 106 (1952) (discussing
early history of intellectual property in developed nations).
" See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive
Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of CorporateIntellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001) (tracing history of trade secrets law and how it affects employment
relationships and social practices).
12 See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPAgreement and New Dynamics of
InternationalIntellectualPropertyLawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'LL. 1, 27-52 (2004) (analyzing
growth and impact of intellectual property in areas of international concern such as
biodiversity, plant genetic resources, public health, and human rights); Peter K Yu, The
Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFsTRA L. REV. 907, 909 (2004) (concluding that new digital
copyright law and its challenges have become "a matter of public significance, affecting all of
us in our daily lives").
13 See Robert Bejesky, Investing in the Dragon:Managingthe PatentVersus TradeSecret
ProtectionDecisionfor the MultinationalCorporationin China, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
437, 438 n.6 (2004) (noting important role of intellectual property protection in transnational
exports and economic development); cf Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 721, 733-37 (2004) (explaining complexity of source of trademarked goods in
commerce, as such goods are manufactured by companies while trademarks associated with
such goods convey different sources).
14 See Colin Darch, DigitalDivide or UnequalExchange? How the NorthernIntellectual
Property Rights Regime Threatens the South, 32 INT'L. J. LEGAL INFO. 488, 489 (2004)
(asserting that "the value of the export to the rest of the world of U.S. copyright products...
exceeded the total for clothes, chemicals, cars, computers and airplanes combined").
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tion of copyrighted materials.'" Commercial success based on
invention and innovation has exploded in recent years." Perceiving
patents as highly valuable assets, corporations and individual
inventors actively seek them such that the number granted by the
U.S. Patent Office has increased approximately threefold in the last
twenty years.' 7 Similarly, during the 2003 fiscal year alone, the
U.S. Copyright Office registered 534,122 copyrightable works.'"
In short, intellectual property today has become so enormously
important 19 that the legal protection and enforcement of intellectual

1

See Gerard N. Magliocca, FromAshes to Fire: Trademarkand Copyrightin Transition,

82 N.C. L. REV. 1009,1044-49 (2004) (discussing impact of Internet revolution on development
of contemporary copyright law). See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN
DIGITAL MEDIA (Aug. 2004) (detailing impact of expansion of digital technology on copyright),
available at httpJ/www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfxn?index=5738&sequence=0&from=0#anchor.
16 See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectiveson Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 876 (1988) (arguing that overemphasis on
innovation without significant technical advances allows too many patents to be issued);
Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the CampusLab: Law, Values and
Rules of Engagementfor Industry-UniversityR&D Partnerships,39 AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 19297 (2002) (detailing joint partnership between government, university, and industry and how
such partnership impacted growth of intellectual property in recent years).
17 See OFFICE OF ELECTRONIC INFO. PRODS./PATENT TECH. MONITORINGDIv., U.S. PATENT
AND TRADEMARKS OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1962-2003 (July 2004),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/webloffices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.pdf (reporting number
of patents issued from 1967 to 2003); see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's
PatentingWhat?An EmpiricalExplorationofPatentProsecution,53 VAND. L. REV. 2099,2118
(2000) (reporting dramatic increase of 39.1% in number of patent applications filed between
1993 and 1998 and 45.4% increase in number of patents issued between 1995 and 1998).
18 COPYRIGHT LAW ADMIN., Registration of Copyrighted Works, in FISCAL YEAR 2003
REPORT (providing detailed annual report of activities for fiscal year 2003), availableat http://
www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2003/Copyright-LawAdministration.pdf (lastvisited Feb.
18, 2005).
"9 Indeed, intellectual property has become so significant that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has admitted that:
These valuable products, collectively known as "Intellectual Property"
(IP), are the primary fuel of the U.S. economic engine. Currently, the U.S.
leads the world in the creation and export of IP and IP-related products.
The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition recently reported that the
combined U.S. copyright industries and derivative businesses account for
more than $433 billion, or 5.68%, of the U.S. Gross National Product,
which is more than any other single manufacturing sector. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics reports that between 1977 and 1996 the growth in the IP
segment of the economy was nearly twice that of the U.S. economy as a
whole. It is also estimated that the software industry alone will employ
more than one million people in the U.S. by the year 2005.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ABOUT THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD UNIT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/fifu/about/about-ipc.htm (last visited
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property rights occupies a central role in international trade" and
relations.2 1
Not surprisingly, major companies today accumulate and possess
large intellectual property portfolios.2 2 For the last ten years, IBM
has led all companies in the number of patents received each year,
including 3,411 issued patents in 2001.23 Canon, Sony, and General
Electric each received more than 1,000 issued patents during 2001.24
Companies with large copyright holdings in the publishing and
entertainment areas enjoy the high export value of their copyrighted
goods, as evidenced by one reported estimate placing the total value
of these U.S. exports as higher than $400 billion annually.25 The
Coca-Cola trademark alone is valued at more than $67 billion, while
the Microsoft brand is valued at $61 billion, IBM at $54 billion, GE
at $44 billion, and Intel at $33 billion in 2004.26

Feb. 16, 2005).
20 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, A NEW ORGANIZATION FOR A NEW
MILLENNIUM:

PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 17

(discussing goals of U.S. Patent and Trademark Offices in protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights at home and abroad), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/annual/2000/00highlights.pdf (last modified Aug. 6, 2004); Michael R. Taylor &
Jerry Cayford, American PatentPolicy, Biotechnology, and AfricanAgriculture: The Casefor
Policy Change, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 321, 371-72 (2004) (analyzing how U.S. utilizes trade
negotiations, trade sanctions, and tariff benefits to protect intellectual property rights
abroad).
21 See Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonizationand the Virtues of Shields
Over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 329 (2004) (explaining relationship between
intellectual property protection and international trade regulations); F. Scott Kieff, Property
Rights and PropertyRules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 699 n.4
(2001) ("Economic research over the past sixty years has amply established a causal link
between the development of intellectual property and the growth of our national economy,
while also showing that intellectual property is an increasingly critical component of United
States capital and foreign trade.").
22 See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation,44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 519 (2003) ("[Ilntellectual property has become more
valuable, and the number of patents, copyrights, and trademarks has increased rapidly."
(citations omitted)).
23 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOP PATENTING
ORGANIZATIONS: CALENDAR YEAR 2001 (reporting top ten organizations receiving most
number of patents, including IBM), availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
taf/top01cos.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
24

Id.

2

See Darch, supra note 14, at 489-90 (stating that in 1997 U.S. exported copyright

products totaled $414 billion).
2 Diane Brady et al., CultBrands, BUS. WK., Aug. 9, 2004, at 59 (ranking top 100 global
trademarks).
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III. THE SCHEME OF TAX AVOIDANCE: IP
HOLDING COMPANY

As intellectual property becomes a more important corporate
asset, many companies with large intellectual property portfolios
search for ways to maximize revenues. A common way to expand
market exposure is through the licensing of intellectual property
assets for new fields of products and services in existing or new
territories." Income derived from licensing intellectual property
28
assets is subject to federal and state taxation as ordinary income.
In recent years, companies have created a scheme to minimize state
taxation of royalty income.2
Under such a scheme, a company with a large intellectual
property portfolio forms a wholly owned subsidiary to hold its
intellectual property assets. 30 The parent company selects a state
jurisdiction that does not tax royalty income received from licensing
intellectual property assets and then forms its subsidiary, the IP
holding company, there.3 ' The parent company transfers all of its
27

See Mary M. Squyres, GlobalLicensing: A License to Use, in HANDLING INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS at 491-92 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks,
& Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 779, 2004) (listing purposes of licensing
intellectual property assets, including greater profitability by licensing to unrelated third
party and by capitalizing on reputation of established trademark).
28 Companies avoided federal taxation by transferring intellectual property to
subsidiaries in Bermuda. See Glenn R. Simpson,A New Twist in Tax Avoidance: FirmsSend
Best Ideas Abroad, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al ("The transfer of intellectual
property-such as trademarks and patents-has become so widespread that it has prompted
an aggressive crackdown by the Internal Revenue Service on alleged abuses that one IRS
consultant says could eventually involve tax claims in the tens of billions of dollars.").
2
See Tun-Jen Chiang, Comment, State Income Taxation of Out-of-State Trademark
Holding Companies, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1553 (2003) (describing trademark holding
company as tax avoidance scheme); Ashley B. Howard, Comment, Does the InternalRevenue
Code Provide a Solution to a Common State Taxation Problem?: ProposingState Adoption
of § 367(d) to Tax Intangibles Holding Subsidiaries, 53 EMORY L.J. 561, 566-67 (2004)
(discussing tax benefits of IP holding company).
" E.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Syl, Inc., 825 A.2d 399, 400, 407 (Md. 2003)
(noting, in consolidated opinion, that parent company Syms assigned all trademarks, trade
names, and advertising slogans to its subsidiary Syl and that parent company, Crown Parent,
assigned its patents and trademarks to its subsidiary, Crown Delaware); Sherwin-Williams
Co. v. Commissioner, 778 N.E.2d 504, 509-10 (Mass. 2002) (noting that parent company
Sherwin-Williams assigned all of its domestic trademarks to its two subsidiaries, DIMC and
SWIMC).
31 E.g., Syl, Inc., 825 A.2d at 401,407 (noting that subsidiaries Syl and Crown Delaware
were incorporated in Delaware for purpose of managing and controlling intellectual property
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intellectual property assets to the IP holding company in exchange
for ownership of 80% or more of stock in the IP holding company.3 2
Such a transfer and exchange is not a taxable event because no
gains are recognized. The IP holding company then licenses the
intellectual property assets back to the parent company3 and in
some instances to sister companies that need to use the intellectual
property assets.3 4 These sister companies, which are also operating
companies, conduct business in numerous or all states and are
generally allowed to deduct, as business expenses, royalties paid to
the IP holding company.3 5 The IP holding company, on the other
hand, receives royalties from the operating companies and does not
have to pay state taxes on that royalty income in the jurisdiction
where the IP holding company was formed.3" The IP holding
company then uses the royalties for loans to the operating compa-

assets); Sherwin-Williams Co., 778 N.E.2d at 509 (stating that parent company selected
Delaware for incorporation of subsidiary because state afforded tax advantages to
corporations confining their activities to holding, maintaining, and managing intangible
assets).
32 E.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 778 N.E.2d. at 510 (stating that parent company and
another of its subsidiaries received 100% of both IP holding companies' stock); In re Toys "R"
Us-NYTEX, Inc., No. TAT(E) 93-1039 (GC), 2004 WL 75386 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Jan. 14,
2004) (noting that parent company wholly owned subsidiary).
"3 E.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 778 N.E.2d at 507-08 (noting that parent company paid
$47 million in royalty payments to two IP holding companies for tax year 1991).
4 E.g., Cambridge Brands, Inc. v. Comm'r, No. C259013, 2003 WL 21665241, at *1 (Mass.
App. Tax Bd. July 16, 2003) (holding that royalties paid by Massachusetts candy manufacturing company to sister Delaware IP holding company for right to use certain trademarks and
formulas were properly deductible as ordinary and necessary business expense because
license of intellectual property rights had valid business purpose and economic substance).
'3 E.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 778 N.E.2d at 520-21 (allowing parent company to deduct
reasonable royalty payments to its subsidiaries as ordinary and necessary expenses). But see
Syms Corp. v. Comm'r, 765 N.E.2d 758, 765 (Mass. 2002) (denying parent company's
deduction of royalty payments to subsidiary because transfer and license-back arrangement
was sham).
' As Delaware corporations, IP holding companies enjoy significant legal and tax
advantages as long as they confine "their activities to holding, maintaining, and managing
intangible assets." Sherwin-WilliamsCo., 778 N.E.2d at 509. Under Delaware law, "royalties
and other income earned by" IP holding companies are "exempt from State taxation." Id.
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (1997 & Supp. 2004)).
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nies and receives interest from those loans.3" The IP holding
company may then pay dividends to the parent company.38
Examples of these tax avoidance schemes are everywhere. The
Limited Stores, Inc., an Ohio corporation, owns numerous retailing
companies that operate stores throughout the United States. 39 The

parent company has also created wholly owned IP holding companies in Delaware to hold well-known trademarks in the clothing
industry, such as "The Limited," "Victoria's Secret," "Express,"
"Abercrombie & Fitch," "Lane Bryant," and "Lerner," which were all
once owned by the parent company but exchanged for stock
ownership in the subsidiaries.4 ° The IP holding companies then
licensed the trademarks to the related retail companies in exchange
for royalty payments. 4 ' For tax year 1994, these same IP holding
companies recorded $301,067,619 in royalty income and
$122,031,344 in interest income from the related retail companies.42
These amounts accounted for 100% of the IP holding companies'
income.43 These IP holding companies enjoy tax exempt status as
passive holding entities in Delaware, their state of incorporation."
KPI, another example, is the IP holding company for the wellknown Kmart Corporation and its related trademarks, which are
worth between $2.7 and $4.1 billion.45 KPI was incorporated in
Michigan, which does not tax income from royalty payments that
KPI receives from its exclusive license arrangement with the Kmart

37 The operating companies will deduct the interest payment on such loans as ordinary
expense. E.g., id. at 522-23 (allowing parent company to deduct interest payment on shortterm loan of $7 million from subsidiary).
8 See Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdictionand the Mythical "PhysicalPresence"

ConstitutionalStandard,54 TAX LAW. 105, 135 (2000) (stating that transfer and license-back
scheme is "fairly common tax avoidance technique").
"9 Sec'y of Revenue v. A & F Trademark, Inc., [2 N.C.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 202-146,
11,041 (N.C. Tax Review Bd. May 7, 2002), aftd, 2003 WL 21665022 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2003),
affd, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
'4 Id. (detailing assignment and license-back arrangement involving well-known retail
clothing trademarks).
41 Id. at 11,041.
42 Id. at 11,042.
43 Id. (noting that IP holding companies accumulated no other source of income, except
royalty income).
Id. at 11,043, 11,055.
Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, [N.M.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1401-004,
21,176 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2001), writ granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002) (table case).
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Corporation.4 6 Kmart Corporation created KPI and infused it with
assets by transferring ownership of all Kmart's domestic trademarks in exchange for all of KPI's stock.4 7 KPI's office is one block
away from the parent company's headquarters and all of KPI's five
employees, including two intellectual property attorneys and their
respective support staff, came from the parent company.4 8
Intellectual property tax schemes are not limited to trademarks.
Indeed, such schemes include patents and other intellectual
property assets. For example, Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc., owns
more than 300 patents related to the process and manufacture of
Gore-Tex products.49 The Gore parent company transferred all of its
patents to Holdings in exchange for all of Holdings' stock.50 The
holding company and the parent company entered into a licensing
arrangement for the patents. 51 Pursuant to the assignment and
license-back arrangement, the holding company manages the patent
portfolio, collects royalties from the use of the patents, and invests
the proceeds in investment vehicles.5 2 The holding company had not
had any employees or office space for some years, and its activities
were conducted by employees at the parent company.53 The holding
company later hired one paralegal, who monitored and administered
the patent portfolio.5 4 The holding company also retained outside

4 See id. (stating that Kmart Corporation paid KPI royalty payments based on 1.1% of
Kmart Corporation's gross sales throughout United States). See generally Little Caesar
Enters. Inc. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 575 N.W.2d 562 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
Single Business Tax Act's franchise fee exception did not preclude franchisor from deducting
monthly percentage payments it received from its single business tax base); Zenith Data Sys.
v. Dep't of the Treasury, 555 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that payments
taxpayer received from consumers pursuant to license agreement for use of computer
software were royalties that could be deducted from taxpayer's single business tax base).
47 Kmart Props., Inc., [N.M.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 401-004, 21,176.
4 See id. (noting that creation of KPI dramatically affected parent company's tax liability
and that KPI, "a corporation with no formal operations in" New Mexico, did not pay state
income taxes on royalty payment income).
4' Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, No. 99-2856 RI, 2002 WL 200918, at *2
(Mo. Tax Comm'n Jan. 3, 2002), rev'd and remandedsubnom, ACME Royalty Co. v. Dir. of
Holdings, Inc., 96 S.W.3d 72 (Mo. 2003) (consolidated opinion).

50

Id. at *1.

5' Id. at *1-'2.
52

Id.

53

Id. at *3.

' Id. (stating that some patent prosecution work was performed by parent company,
which did not receive reimbursement).

HOLDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

20051

1167

attorneys to conduct patent prosecution work."5 Over a three-year
period, the holding company received about $120 million in royalty
payments from the parent company.5 6 The subsidiary filed no state
income tax returns but filed information returns with Delaware, the
subsidiary's state of incorporation.5 7 Not surprisingly, Delaware
does not tax royalty payments."
Essentially, under the intellectual property tax scheme, companies with large intellectual property portfolios can legitimately avoid
paying state taxes on income derived from royalties.5 9 Some states
have attempted to reach and tax this income based on the licensing
of intellectual property assets.6 ° These states face constitutional
obstacles in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota.61
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF NEXUS
PHYSICAL PRESENCE

Whether a state can tax an out-of-state or foreign company, such
as an IP holding company, is a controversial and complex issue.
What are the constitutional requirements a state must satisfy in
order to tax an out-of-state company? There is no clear authority
directly addressing the issue. Worse, the last attempt by the U.S.
Supreme Court to shed light on the constitutional requirements for
state taxation of an out-of-state company led to more speculation

55 Id.
56Id.
57

Id. at *4.

§ 1902(b)(8) (1997 & Supp. 2004) (exempting corporations
from state tax whose activities within Delaware "are confined to the maintenance and
management of their intangible investments," which include "patents, patent applications,
trademarks, trade names and similar types of intangible assets").
59 Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 219 (N.J. Tax Ct. Oct. 23, 2003)
(recognizing that transfer and license-back arrangement is tax avoidance scheme). The Lanco
court noted that "[1]egitimate means to minimize taxation are, of course, the prerogative of
any business and perhaps the dictate of market-place competition." Id.
58 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30,

60 See Prentiss Willson, Recent State CorporateIncome andFranchiseTax Developments,

491 PLI/TAX 9, 18-29 (2001) (surveying taxations of in-state use of licensed intellectual
property rights).
61 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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and confusion about the limitations on state authority to tax royalty
income received by out-of-state IP holding companies.
A. THE QUILL MANDATE

The U.S. Supreme Court imposed a physical presence nexus
requirement on states that impose a taxation burden on out-of-state
companies in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.62 Quill was a Delaware
corporation with offices and warehouses in Illinois, California, and
Georgia.63 It had neither tangible property nor employees in North
Dakota.64 Quill engaged in the business of selling office equipment
and supplies via mail-order catalogs. 5 It estimated that $1 million
in sales were made annually to 3,000 customers residing in North
Dakota.6" Quill delivered merchandise to customers by mail or
common carrier from out-of-state locations.67 The State of North
Dakota required Quill to collect a use tax"5 from North Dakota
consumers who purchased Quill products via mail-order catalogs
and to remit the collected tax to the State. 9
North Dakota essentially seized the remarkable growth of the
mail-order business, which grew from a relatively inconsequential

62

Id. Prior to the Quill decision, it was "generally considered that the requirement of the

Due Process Clause that an entity have certain minimum contacts with a taxing jurisdiction
to support the imposition of a tax was not different from the substantial nexus component of
the Commerce Clause standard." Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 204.
Quill, 504 U.S. at 302.
6 Id.
69 Id.
66 Id.
67 id.
6
"Use tax" is a tax levied on the use of property purchased. Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of
Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 205 n.2 (N.J. Tax Ct. Oct. 23, 2003). A sales tax is "[a] tax imposed
on the sale of goods and services, [usually] measured as a percentage of their price." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1498-99 (8th ed. 2004).
69 Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03. The North Dakota use tax statute and regulation, as
amended in 1987, required mail-order companies that engaged in solicitation to collect and
remit use tax, even if those companies maintained no property or personnel in North Dakota.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991) (requiring "retailer maintaining a place of
business in" North Dakota to collect use tax from consumers and remit it to State). The term
"retailer" included "every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a
consumer market in th[e] state." Id. § 57-40.2-01(6). The term "regular or systematic
solicitation" meant three or more advertisements within a twelve-month period. N.D. ADMIN.
CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988).
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market niche to a "goliath" with annual sales that reached " 'the
staggering figure of $183.3 billion' "within a short period of twenty
years, by imposing on out-of-state companies the obligation to collect
a use tax on property purchased by in-state consumers and to remit
that tax to the State.7 ° The rationale for imposing the use tax was
the economic benefit, legal infrastructure, support, and opportunities provided by the State to out-of-state companies that facilitate
the demand for those companies' products and, consequently, the
growth of such companies and their respective markets.7 1 In the
balance, the State believed there was a constitutionally sufficient
nexus72 to justify imposing the purely administrative duty of
collecting and remitting the use tax.73
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with much of North Dakota's
reasoning, but declined to overrule its own precedent on the
constitutional limitations of the taxing power of states on out-ofstate companies.7 4 The Court reemphasized and clarified that state
taxing statutes on out-of-state companies must satisfy both the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. 75 The Court uncoupled
the two Clauses and explained that each Clause poses different and
distinct limits on the states' taxing power.76 A state may be
'0 Quill, 504 U.S. at 303 (quoting Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203,208-09 (N.D.
1991)).

71 See id. at 304 (noting North Dakota court's reasoning that State had created " 'an
economic climate that fosters demand for' Quill's products, maintained a legal infrastructure
that protected that market, and disposed of 24 tons of catalogs and flyers mailed by Quill into
the State every year" (quoting Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 218-19)).
72

Id.
73 Id. at 303 (noting North Dakota court observed that "advances in computer technology

greatly eased the burden of compliance with a 'welter of complicated obligations' imposed by
state and local taxing authorities").
"' Id. at 301-02 ("[Wle must either reverse the State Supreme Court or overrule Bellas
Hess. While we agree with much of the state court's reasoning, we take the former course.").
71 Id. at 305 (emphasizing that in cases involving application of state taxing statutes to
out-of-state sellers, precedents dictate that both Due Process and Commerce Clauses be
satisfied). The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution states: "No person shall... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
provides that: "The Congress shall have Power . .. [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
76 Quill, 504 U.S. at 302; see also Pamela M. Krill, Note, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota:
Tax Nexus Underthe Due Process and Commerce ClausesNo Longer the Same, 1993 WiS. L.
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consistent with the Due Process Clause and have the authority to
tax a particular out-of-state company, but imposition of that tax
may nonetheless stand in violation of the Commerce Clause.77
Indeed, the Court explained in great detail that due process
mainly concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity
and that the constitutional inquiry often focuses on "notice" and
"fair warning" as the touchstone of nexus analysis. 7' For tax
purposes, the Due Process Clause requires some minimum connection between a state and the person, property, or transaction it
seeks to tax.79 In light of Quill's purposeful direction of its advertising and selling activities toward North Dakota consumers, the Due
Process Clause does not bar the State from enforcing its use tax
against Quill."°
The Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement, in contrast,
focus on structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on
the national economy.8 ' For tax purposes, the analysis centers on

REV. 1405, 1425-26 (1993) (analyzing Quill on distinction between Due Process and Commerce
Clauses and critiquing Quill on its potential impact on state's ability to impose taxation on
foreign companies).
77 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 ("Although the [Due Process and Commerce Clauses are
closely related, they] pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States. Accordingly,
while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a
particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.").
7'8 The Court, in uncoupling the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, succinctly stated
that:
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental
activity. Thus, at the most general level, the due process nexus analysis
requires that we ask whether an individual's connections with a State are
substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of power over him.
We have, therefore, often identified "notice" or "fair warning" as the
analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis.
Id. at 312. The Court noted that due process jurisprudence has evolved in the preceding
twenty-five years, primarily in the area of in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 307.
Due process jurisprudence, as now applied to state taxation on out-of-state sellers,
suggests that such a seller or corporation "clearly has fair warning that [its] activity may
subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Id. at 308 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)).
71 Id. (stating that solicitation through "a deluge of catalogs" alone met due process
requirement for state use tax purpose because "requirements of due process are met
irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State").
8o Id.
8' Id. at 312. Moreover, the Court noted that as the Commerce Clause jurisprudence has
evolved, "no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce" that causes direct
burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 309.
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whether a tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided
by the state. 2 The fair apportionment and nondiscrimination
inquiry prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden
onto interstate commerce.83 The substantial nexus and the relationship between the tax and the state-provided services inquiries seek
to limit the reach of the state taxing authority, ensuring that state
taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce. 4 Accordingly, the substantial nexus requirement is not similar to the due
process minimum contacts requirement, which is a proxy for notice
and fair warning, "but [is] rather a means for limiting state burdens
on interstate commerce." 5 A company may have the minimum
contacts with a taxing state required by the Due Process Clause, yet
lack the substantial nexus required by the Commerce Clause. 6
Since Quill neither owned property in North Dakota nor had
employees in North Dakota, the Court reversed the state court's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with the Court's opinion on the substantial nexus requirement of the
Commerce Clause. 7
2 Id. at 311. The Court reapplied the four-part test first developed in Complete Auto

Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
' Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
84 Id.
85 Id.
' E.g., id. (stating that contrary to North Carolina's suggestion, "a corporation may have
the 'minimum contacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet
lack the 'substantial nexus' with that State as required by the Commerce Clause").
87 Id. at 313-19. Specifically, the Court noted that:
North Dakota's use tax illustrates well how a state tax might unduly
burden interstate commerce. On its face, North Dakota law imposes a
collection duty on every vendor who advertises in the State three times in
a single year. Thus, absent the Bellas Hess rule, a publisher who included
a subscription card in three issues of its magazine, a vendor whose radio
advertisements were heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a
corporation whose telephone sales force made three calls into the State,
all would be subject to the collection duty. What is more significant,
similar obligations might be imposed by the Nation's 6,000-plus taxing
jurisdictions.
Id. at 313 n.6. The Court explicitly rejected the finding of nexus based on Quill's contact with
North Dakota:
In addition to its common-carrier contacts with the State, Quill also
licensed software to some of its North Dakota clients. The State "concedes
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The Quill decision sent a clear message to states that the
Commerce Clause limits the taxing power of states regarding out-ofstate companies. A taxing state must establish the physical
presence of out-of-state companies within itsjurisdiction in order for
a state's sales or use taxing statute to pass constitutional muster.
The constitutional requirement as dictated by Quill has direct
consequences on state revenue since a state's reach to outside sellers
is no longer expansive."
B. POST-QUILL CHAOS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Since Quill directly limits state power to impose sales and use
taxes on out-of-state companies, a major question in the post-Quill
era is whether the physical presence requirement of the Commerce
Clause extends to state power to tax income received from out-ofstate companies.89 Some commentators asserted that the physical
presence constitutional standard is a myth with respect to limiting
state power to tax income received by out-of-state companies. °
Further, the assertion suggests that Quill permits state taxation of

that the existence in North Dakota of a few floppy diskettes to which Quill
holds title seems a slender thread upon which to base nexus." We agree.
Although title to "a few floppy diskettes" present in a State might
constitute some minimal nexus, in National Geographic Society v.
CaliforniaBd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977), we expressly
rejected a " 'slightest presence' standard of constitutional nexus." We
therefore conclude that Quill's licensing of software in this case does not
meet the "substantial nexus" requirement of the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 315 n.8 (citations omitted).
' See Diehl, supra note 5, at 44 (discussing decline in state income tax rate for
corporations from 9.6% in 1980 to about 5.2% in 2002).
8 This question has no clear answer because Quill has left many uncertainties. See
Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 425, 460 (1997)
("At the end of the analytical day, one is once again faced with uncertainties in the income
tax arena similar to those confronted in the sales and use tax context.").
o See generally Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps QuiLl- Constitutional Nexus,
Intangible Property and the State Taxation of Income, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407 (1994)
(claiming Quill physical presence requirement is insufficient to clear up issues regarding
taxing power of states under Due Process and Commerce Clauses and discussing South
Carolina case that answered question of whether state can tax income of corporation outside
state where income is derived from intangible property used within state); Fatale, supranote
38, at 105 (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court's physical presence requirement, examining how
state courts have applied this requirement, and concluding that physical presence
requirement is not requirement in fact).
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such income "by virtue of an intentional exploitation of the state's
market without physical presence in the state."91
Others, however, interpreted Quill as dictating a bright-line
approach not only for sales and use taxes, but also for state income
taxation of out-of-state companies, which requires physical presence
for substantial nexus in order to satisfy the Commerce Clause
mandate.9 2 To read Quill otherwise would render an incongruity:
Out-of-state companies would not have a sufficient nexus with the
taxing state for sales and use tax purposes, but would have a
substantial nexus with the taxing state for income tax purposes.93
As a result, a number of states tried taxing the income received
by out-of-state IP holding companies that are separate entities, have
no tangible assets, and hire no employees in the taxing state. 4
Meanwhile, other states have failed to reach IP holding companies
for lack of physical presence in the taxing state, even though the IP
holding companies license their intellectual property assets to
affiliates or parent companies for use within that state. 95
V. SITUS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INQUIRY

In desperate attempts to reach income generated by the licensing
of intellectual property assets, states will flex their taxing power in
order to subject out-of-state IP holding companies to state income
91 Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 208 (N.J. Tax Ct. Oct. 23, 2003)

(analyzing commentator's discussion of Quill).
92 See Chiang, supranote 29, at 1542 ("A physical presence requirement for income taxes
is necessary to prevent states from shifting their tax burdens onto out-of-state companies.
It is not as necessary for use taxes, because the taxing state's own consumers will end up
bearing part of the burden of the use tax.").
93 See Cerro Copper Prods., Inc. v. State, No. F. 94-444, 1995 WL 800114, at *3 (Ala. Dep't
Rev. Dec. 11, 1995)
If the Taxpayer does not have sufficient nexus with Alabama for sales and
use tax purposes, which it clearly does not have under Quill, then it is
incongruous that the taxpayer would have 'substantial nexus' to be subject
to Alabama's franchise tax. As a practical matter, the same benefits of a
bright-line, physical presence test cited in Quill, at page 1915, for sales
and use tax purposes would also apply equally to other types of taxes.
94 See John E. Gaggini, State Taxation of PassiveIncome Subsidiaries,473 PLI/TAX 779,
793-96 (2000) (surveying states that tax income received by out-of-state companies). Notably,
South Carolina, New Mexico, and North Carolina are the leading states in such taxation. Id.
9' See id. at 797-801 (surveying states that declined to tax income received by out-of-state
companies).
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taxation. These states circumvent Quill by adopting an approach
centered on the belief that intellectual property has a business situs
where the goods associated with those intellectual property rights
are offered for sale at locales within the state. s6
A. BUSINESS SITUS

Under the business situs theory, intangibles acquire situs for
taxation purposes if they have become an integral part of local
business.9" Under this premise, intangibles are assigned a tax situs
in a state where the owner or holder of the intangibles is not
physically present.9 " The business situs of intellectual property
goods-whether trademarked, copyrighted, or patented-allows the
taxing jurisdiction to have a substantial nexus with the out-of-state
company.99 Thus, applying the business situs theory, a state can tax
royalty income derived from the intellectual property rights used in
connection with the sale of goods or services within the state, even
though the holder of the intellectual property is incorporated, owns
tangible property, or has employees conducting business in a
different jurisdiction.' 00
6 Business situs is also referred to as the "economic presence" approach. See id. at 793
(stating that South Carolina adopted "economic presence" approach where "taxable nexus
may be established through economic benefits derived from the taxing state" in royalty
income cases).
' See Megan E. Groves, Where There's a Will, There's a Way: State Sales and Use
Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 74 IND. L.J. 293, 305 (1998) (noting that intangibles
transferred into state acquired business situs within that state because they had become part
of local business conducted within state); John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A
Jurisprudentialand Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 347 (2003) (noting that
"business situs" was first used in Due Process case where New York successfully attempted
to tax nonresident on gain from sale of membership in New York Stock Exchange).
98 See Paull Mines, Commentary Conversing with Professor Hellerstein: Electronic
Commerce and Nexus Propel Sales and Use Tax Reform, 52 TAX L. REV. 581, 606-07 (1997)
Business situs presence satisfies the due process requirement that
property must be within the taxing state before it can be made subject to
a property tax.... Ownership of an intangible with a business situs in
the taxing state creates jurisdiction for the state to impose an income tax
on the gain realized by a nonresident from the sale of the intangible. The
state has sufficient jurisdiction even though the nonresident exclusively
operated from a point outside of the taxing state.
99 Id. at 607.
10 See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 17 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 992 (1993) (applying business situs and concluding that intangibles acquired business
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The extension of the business situs rule to IP holding companies
appeared twenty years ago in an administrative decision, In re
Addax Music Co. 1 In this case, the New York Department of
Taxation and Finance (Department) ruled that petitioner Addax
Music, a wholly owned subsidiary of Paramount Pictures that only
held copyrights to musical compositions and received royalties
through its membership in an intermediary, was subject to New
York income tax in the form of a franchise tax.' Addax Music was
a California corporation and had no employees, and all of its
accounting and administrative functions were performed by
employees of Paramount Pictures in California. °3 Addax Music
received its royalty payments via its membership in ASCAP, a
nonprofit membership association of composers, lyricists, and music
publishers.0 4 ASCAP collected fees from nonexclusive blanket
licenses and distributed them to its members." 5 The Department
asserted that although Addax Music was not based in New York, its
copyrighted compositions nevertheless had a taxable situs there.0 6
because the copyrighted compositions were integrated in the local

situs in South Carolina); see also Fatale, supra note 90, at 411 ("The business situs rule...
states generally that an item of intangible property requires a taxable situs in a state when
it is used in that state in a local business.").
10' No. 28376 TSB-H-85(1)(C), 1984 WL 179619 (N.Y. Dep't Tax. & Fin. Dec. 14, 1984).
The doctrine of business situs, however, has been applied in much earlier cases that did not
involve intellectual property. E.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204,
213 (1929) (citations of cases omitted) (holding that decedent's bonds and certificates "had
acquired permanent situs for taxation in New York," not in state of owner's domicile, because
they had become integral parts of local businesses).
102 The Audit Division issued a Notice of Estimated Deficiency for the tax years from 1971
through 1977 for the franchise taxes due under New York Tax Law. Addax Music Co., 1984
WL 179619, at *1. The Department held a hearing and subsequently decided that Addax
Music was subject to the franchise tax on business corporations for the years at issue. Id. at
*4.
103 Id. at *1.
0
Id. at *1-*2. ASCAP is the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
Generally, ASCAP holds the repertory of all the copyrighted works of its members. On behalf
of its members, ASCAP grants nonexclusive blanket licenses to users. Id.
105 Id. at *2. ASCAP could not, however, determine from its records how much of a
member's royalty for a particular composition is derived from a particular state. Id. It could
only ascertain the amount of fees collected from licensees in a particular state, such as New
York. Id.
106 Id.
at *3. The Department stated that "intangibles ... have a taxable situs of their
own which may be away from the domicile of the owner if they have become integral parts of
some local business." Id. (citations omitted).
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New York business through the licensing arrangements.1' The
Department found that Addax Music, through ASCAP, monitored
and licensed its music composition in New York.'0 8 Essentially,
Addax Music obtained its royalty income through the copyrights
used in the local New York business market.'
Therefore Addax
Music, a copyright holding company, was subject to the imposition
of a New York franchise tax on business corporations." 0 The Addax
Music case did not advance any further and has since remained an
obscure administrative decision.
Facing the stringent Quill mandate of physical presence for
substantial nexus and the subsequent shrinkage of state tax dollars,
states have aggressively resurrected the business situs rule and
applied it with vigor in cases involving significant intellectual
property rights."' The leading case in the revival effort was
Geoffrey, Inc. v. South CarolinaTax Commission, which applied the
business situs theory to that state's taxation of income in order to
reach an IP holding company that had no physical contact in South
Carolina." 2

107 Id. The Department framed the issue as "whether the copyrights were an integral part

of some local business activity" of Addax Music. Id. The Department affirmatively answered
this inquiry. Id.
"" Id. (noting that petitioner through ASCAP licensed use of its copyrighted music and
collected its royalties based on user fee distribution formula).
109 Id.
at *4 ("[Pletitioner's means of continued efforts in the pursuit of profit and gain as
well as the local business into which petitioner's intangibles were, of necessity, integrated."
(internal punctuation omitted)).
110

Id.

1' See Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, [N.M.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 401004,21,181 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 27,2001), writgranted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002) (table case)
(regarding Commerce Clause test, court observed that whatever test is, Kmart's trademark
subsidiary has sufficient nexus by virtue of Kmart's use of its trademarks in New Mexico
market for purpose of generating substantial income); Geoffrey v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437
S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993) (holding that Delaware company receiving royalty income from use
of intangible trademark in South Carolina had sufficient nexus with South Carolina for
purposes of tax liability despite lacking physical presence or tangible property within state).
An example of a recent application of business situs is a July 1, 2002, Letter of Findings
issued by Indiana, wherein the Department of Revenue ruled that the taxpayer's intellectual
property had acquired an Indiana "business situs because all of the value derived from this
property was attributable entirely to activities occurring in Indiana." Michael W.
McLoughlin, JurisdictionandNexus, in 575 STATE & LOCAL TAXATION: WHAT EVERY LAWYER
NEEDS TO KNOw 93, 109 (PLI Tax Lawyer & Estate Planning Course, Handbook Series No.
Jo-008V, 2003).
12 437 S.E.2d at 19-20.
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In Geoffrey, Toys "R" Us, Inc., created Geoffrey, Inc., a whollyowned subsidiary, in Delaware. 113 Geoffrey owned all trademarks
and know-how and licensed this intellectual property to the parent
company in exchange for royalty payments." 4 In 1985, Toys "R" Us
began doing business in South Carolina and since then had made
royalty payments to Geoffrey based on South Carolina sales." 5 The
South Carolina Supreme Court applied the business situs theory to
the intellectual property licensed for use in South Carolina and
found that the intellectual property was located in South
Carolina." 6 That subjected Geoffrey, the intellectual property
holder, to South Carolina taxation."' The court rejected Geoffrey's
argument that its intellectual property assets were held at its
corporate headquarters in Delaware, not in South Carolina."'
Without analysis, the court summarily ruled that the constitutional
requirement of substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause" 9
was established because the intellectual property was present

Id. at 15.
...Id. (describing transactions between Geoffrey and parent company with respect to
trademarks and trade names). The parent company transferred all trademarks and trade
names to Geoffrey, and Geoffrey granted an exclusive license to the parent company to use
the trademarks and trade names in the United States, except New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Id. In addition, Geoffrey granted an exclusive right to
the parent company to use Geoffrey's know-how in connection with the advertising,
marketing, and sales of products associated with the trademarks. Id. at 17. Geoffrey, in
exchange for the license grant, received 1% of the net sales by the parent company or its
affiliates or subsidiaries. Id. The royalty payments were transferred via wire from a Toys
"R" Us account in Pennsylvania to a Geoffrey account in New York. Id.
115 Id. at 15. Toys "R" Us subsequently deducted the royalty payments made to Geoffrey
from its South Carolina taxable income. Id. The South Carolina tax commission allowed this
deduction despite its initial opposition. Id.
116 Id. at 17 ("[lIntangibles may acquire a situs for taxation other than at the domicile of
the owner if they have become integral parts of some local business." (citations omitted)).
117 Id. (finding that "Geoffrey's purposeful direction of activity toward South Carolina as
well as its possessing intangible property here provide a definite link between South Carolina
and the income derived by Geoffrey from the use of its trademarks and trade names in this
State").
118 Id.
11 Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Quill specifically stated that the Due Process
113

requirement is distinct from the Commerce Clause standard, the South Carolina court took
a contrary position, importing its Due Process analysis into its Commerce Clause analysis.
Id. at 18 n.5 ("Further discussion of the remaining requirements of the Commerce Clause is
unnecessary. Our Due Process analysis of the benefits conferred upon Geoffrey applied with
equal force here and need not be repeated.").
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through the licensing arrangement, and the royalty income was
derived from such license.12 °
Further support for the business situs rule was offered in Kmart
Properties,Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Department, wherein the
New Mexico Court of Appeals held that KPI, Kmart's Michigan
trademark holding company, was subject to New Mexico income
taxation.1 2 1 The New Mexico Court of Appeals followed Geoffrey,
reasoning that KPI had a substantial nexus with New Mexico
through its trademark licensing activity with Kmart stores within
New Mexico's economic market for the purpose of generating income
for KPI. 22 The court concluded that the "combination of Kmart
Corporation's activities in New Mexico, together with the tangible
presence of KPI's marks, constitute [d] the functional equivalent of
physical presence," even though KPI did not have any of its own
employees, operations, offices, or facilities physically located within
New Mexico. 2 3 KPI was subject to New Mexico income taxation.'2 4
Likewise, in a 2002 case, Secretary of Revenue v. A & F Trademark, Inc., the North Carolina Tax Board held that IP holding
companies were subject to North Carolina taxation because the
subsidiaries' trademarks and their associated goodwill were used in
North Carolina at numerous retail stores. 2 ' The subsidiaries were

120

Id. at 18 ("The presence of intangible property alone issufficient to establish nexus....

We hold that by licensing intangibles for use in this State and deriving income from their use
here, Geoffrey has a 'substantial nexus' with South Carolina.").
Recently, the South Carolina Tax Commission issued a revenue ruling that claims the
licensing of trademarks or trade names to either related or unrelated entities with locations
in South Carolina constitutes a sufficient nexus to subject the out-of-state licensor to South
Carolina income tax. Nexus CreatingActivities for Income Taxes, S.C. Revenue Ruling No.
03-4, at 6 (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.sctax.org/NR/rdonlyres/D07DB5A7-82F84AEE-9241-F680FE81F93E/0/RR034.pdf.
121 [N.M.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH)
401-004, 21,176 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2001), writ
granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002) (table case).
122 Id.
Pursuant to the license agreement executed in Michigan, KPI licensed trademarks
to Kmart Corporation and received royalty payments based on 1.1% of Kmart Corporation's
gross sales throughout the United States. Id.
123 Id.
KPI protested that the imposition of state income tax violated the Commerce
Clause due to KPI's lack of physical presence in New Mexico. Id. The court, however, ruled
that the physical presence does not extend to state income taxation. Id.
124 Id.
125 [2 N.C.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH)
202-146, 11,041 (N.Y. Tax Rev. Bd. May 7, 2002). The
Board noted that the IP holding companies own and license trademarks to nine retail
companies that have more than 130 stores located in North Carolina. Id.
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Delaware corporations, holding trademarks previously owned by
The Limited and related retail companies. 1 26 These same retail
companies transferred their trademarks to the IP holding companies
and obtained the license rights to use these same trademarks in
exchange for royalty fees from the subsidiaries. 127 The Limited and
the related retail companies deducted royalty payments from their
income for North Carolina. 2 ' The Tax Board found that the
subsidiaries' trademarks exist in North Carolina since trademarks
are the kind of property that "exist[s] only where it is used." 2 9
Further, the use of trademarks permanently affixed to retail
locations and appearing on the labels of merchandise sold at such
stores renders the marks in use each time employees at the
locations sell the merchandise. 3 ' Therefore, such use of the
trademarks occurs in North Carolina and preserves the existence of
the subsidiaries' trademarks. Accordingly, the IP holding companies are subject to North Carolina taxation.' 3 '
These court and administrative decisions illustrate that the
business situs theory has been revived by local taxing authorities to
extend the state's taxing power to reach out-of-state IP holding

126

Id.

The IP holding companies are Lanco, Inc., for Lane Bryant and related

trademarks; Lernco, Inc., for Lerner and related trademarks; A & F Trademark, Inc., for
Abercrombie & Fitch and related trademarks; V. Secret Stores, Inc., for Victoria's Secret and
related trademarks; Expressco for Limited Express or "Express" related trademarks;
Caciqueco, Inc., for Cacique and related trademarks; Structureco, Inc., for Structure and
related trademarks; Limtoo, Inc., for Limited Too and related trademarks; and Limco
Investments, Inc., for The Limited, Inc., and related trademarks. Id.
127 Id. at 11,055-56 (stating that IP holding companies received $301,067,619 in royalty
income and $122,031,344 in interest income from related retail companies in 1994 tax year).
128 Id. at 11,055.
129 Id. at 11,056 (adopting Assistant Secretary's reasoning).
[Pirinciples of trademark law ... property cannot exist apart from an
established business in which it is used; if the property is not used, the
property is considered abandoned and ceases to exist. The Taxpayers'
property therefore exists only where it is used. The Taxpayers' property
is used extensively in North Carolina in connection with established
businesses. These established businesses are the 130 plus North Carolina
retail locations of the Taxpayers' related retail companies.

Id.

Id.
131 Id. (affirming findings by Assistant Secretary that IP holding companies own "income130

producing property in North Carolina" and license "income-producing property in North
Carolina," and therefore, IP holding companies were "doing business" under applicable North
Carolina statutes and administrative rules).
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companies.'3 2 The decisions reflect a desperate attempt by local
taxing authorities to address the need to raise revenue in the postQuill era since the Quill Court mandated a bright-line approach to
state taxation wherein the physical presence of a foreign company
in the taxing jurisdiction is required.133 The attempt to distinguish
Quill as applicable only to use and sales tax cases, not income tax
cases, propels adoption of the business situs theory wherein the
presence of intellectual property is sufficient to justify the substantial nexus between the taxing jurisdiction and the foreign IP holding
34
company.1
B. PROBLEMS WITH BUSINESS SITUS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

A state's desire to reach royalty payments received by foreign IP
holding companies is understandable since foreign IP holding
companies are not subject to any state taxation because their royalty
payments are "nowhere" income.'3 5 They enjoy state tax-free status
See Sec'y, Dep't of Revenue v. GAP (Apparel), Inc., 886 So. 2d 459, 462 (La. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that trademarks licensed by California corporation for use in Louisiana are
integral part of Louisiana licensee's businesses and thus California corporation's trademarks
had acquired business situs in Louisiana for corporate income tax purpose); Lanco, Inc. v.
Dir., Div. ofTaxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 210-12 (N.J. Tax Ct. Oct. 23, 2003) (critiquing Geoffrey
and "New Mexico state court decision" for their proposition that physical nexus is required
for state income taxation and noting that Geoffrey both failed to engage in Commerce Clause
inquiry and cited to precedents on due process analysis for support); Indiana Letter of
Finding, 26 Ind. Reg. 959,959-60 (2002) (finding trademarks of Delaware IP holding company
had business situs in Indiana for both adjusted gross income tax and gross income tax
purposes).
" See Howard, supra note 29, at 574-79 (noting that because Quill left question open as
to physical presence requirement for state income taxation, some states have sidestepped
Quill by asserting economic nexus theory and attributional nexus theory, among others).
'3' See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 210-11 (critiquing thesis of business situs subsequent to
Quill).
135 The frustration with "nowhere" income has been forcefully expressed in a dissenting
opinion in Acme Royalty Co. v. Director of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72, 78 (Mo. 2002) (Wolff, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted):
[Tihese corporations shifted income taxable in Missouri to Delaware,
132

where income from patents and trademarks is tax-free ....

[A] bare

corporate change can make income that is taxable today not taxable
tomorrow. The result is the creation of so-called nowhere income-income
that is taxed in no state.
Nowhere income, it might be noted, is not just affecting individual
states.... Companies set up offshore subsidiaries so they can transfer
royalties from sales of products made outside the United States to places
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due to the resultant shifting of intellectual property asset ownership
within the corporate structure. The "nowhere" income has become
a frustration to states futilely trying to extend their reach to tax
such income.' 3 6 However, categorically assigning intellectual
property like patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks a
business situs wherever the products associated with such intellectual property rights are offered for sale 3 ' is overreaching.
Indeed, under the business situs theory, national book authors
have much to fear from a state's taxation reach. For example, John
Grisham, a national author of legal thrillers, has his books sold in
major bookstores across the United States. 3 ' In order for the
legitimate sale of his books to occur, both the John Grisham name
and the associated bundle of copyrights-such as derivative,
reproduction, distribution, public display, and performance
rights' 3 9 -have already been the subject of a license arrangement
between the book publisher and the author. 4 0 Like many national

like Bermuda.... By moving their profits to places where such income
is not taxable, companies are avoiding taxation in places such as Missouri
where those profits were derived.
Id.

136 See id. (noting corporations' avoidance of state and federal taxes).
137

Id. at 79-80 (Wolff, J., dissenting) (asserting that "intellectual properties, the patent

and trademark rights, are part of the products that are sold," and thus holders of such
intellectual property benefit from state where products are sold, and that benefit should
subject such holders to state income taxation); see also GAP, 886 So. 2d at 462 (finding that
licensed trademarks provide connection with Louisiana for corporate income tax purposes).
3
See http://www.randomhouse.com/features/grisham/author.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2005) (providing listing and ranking of Grisham's books).
139 Copyright law grants the author ownership of a copyright, as well as the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1)
to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; [and]
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
140 The arrangement between publishers and authors was noted by the U.S. Supreme
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authors, Grisham has appeared on book tours to promote his
novels.14 1 Thus, he may be deemed actively involved at the macro
level in the local business of selling books. Book authors generally
receive their royalty payments based on the number of copies sold.' 42
National authors most likely receive their income from royalty
payments, whether in the form of an advance, lump sum, or periodic
installments. 41 3 Since the copyrights and author's name are integral
to the business of selling books at the local level, state taxing
authorities would argue that Grisham's intellectual property has
acquired business situs in each state where the books are sold.'
Therefore, according to the business situs rule, a state may tax
Grisham on the royalty income that he receives from his publisher.
Grisham potentially faces such taxation in all states, except those
few states that do not impose a tax on royalty income, such as
Michigan and Delaware. That certainly leads to multiple taxation
problems as well as an administrative impossibility for authors as
taxpayers. 145

Court in Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 175 n.43 (1985) (noting usual practice in
publishing industry that "book authors usually contract with book publishers for the
publication of their works, the publisher taking title to all rights in the work subject to the
provisions of the contract" (citation omitted)).
141 Grisham signed books at independent bookstores before he became an internationally
known author. See Bob Summer, Grisham'sSouthern Loyalists, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Mar. 3,
2003 (noting Grisham's return to five independent bookstores for signings), availableat http://
www.keepmedia.com/ShowItemDetails.do?itemID=119968&extID=10032&oliID=213 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2005).
142 Mills Music, Inc., 469 U.S. at 175 n.43 ("The author usually receives a royalty
computed as a percentage of the price at which each book is sold or as a percentage of the
total volume of sales." (citation omitted)).
"4' See Comm'r v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 385 n.8 (1949) (noting for tax purposes "that
a payment in the nature of a rent or royalty is in a lump sum rather than so much per
annum, per unit of property, per performance, per book sold, or a certain percentage of the
receipts or profits, does not alter the character of the payment as rent or royalty" (citations
omitted)).
144 See Acme Royalty Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72, 72 (Mo. 2002) (holding that
sufficient business within state merits paying state income tax on royalty income); Kmart
Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, [N.M.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) § 401-004,21,176 (N.M.
Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2001), writ granted, 40 P.3d 1008 (N.M. 2002) (table case) (same); In re
Addax Music Co., 1984 WL 179619, at *1 (N.Y. Dep't Tax & Fin. Dec. 14, 1984) (same);
Geoffrey v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 13 (S.C. 1993) (same).
145 See Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 216 (N.J. Tax Ct. Oct. 23,
2003) (noting tax expert's testimony that multiple taxation and administrative inefficiency
are among potential problems if state taxation fails to adhere to Commerce Clause
requirements).
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Moreover, copyrights and other intellectual property do not exist
in perpetuity, and Grisham's intellectual property rights in
connection with his books may expire before all the physical copies
of the books are sold.' 4 6 This means Grisham may still receive
royalty payments for the books in print while his intellectual
property rights have already terminated. 4 ' Could states continue
to assert that there is a substantial nexus between the state and
Grisham, even though Grisham's intellectual property rights no
longer exist? The link between Grisham and the state vis-A-vis the
intellectual property rights previously used in the sale of Grisham
books at various locations within a state vanishes as there are no
longer intangible rights to form the business situs.
Constitutionally, the business situs theory has additional
problems. Courts applying and commentators advocating the
business situs rule often prematurely limit the business situs to the
due process analysis. 4 ' They ignore the Commerce Clause nexus
analysis.' 4 9 This is in direct conflict with the established requirement that states may impose taxation to the extent constitutionally
permissible, which ensures both Due Process and Commerce Clause
requirements are satisfied.5 ° Since the Quill Court interpreted the
146 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (establishing term of copyright protection as life of author

plus seventy years).
147 A parallel example is the license of Listerine. Though the trade secret of the Listerine
formula is known in the trade, the licensee continues to pay the licensor royalty payments
pursuant to the contract. See Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F.
Supp. 655, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (upholding contract between parties where trade secret
became discoverable).
148 E.g., Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16-17 (analyzing business situs of intellectual property
under due process and finding that "Geoffrey's purposeful direction of activity toward South
Carolina as well as its possessing intangible property here provide a definite link between
South Carolina and the income derived by Geoffrey from the use of its trademarks and trade
names in this State").
149 See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 210 (noting that cases that applied business situs rule
focused only on due process analysis). The Lanco court stated that such case authorities
failed to lend support to the assertion that the "Commerce Clause nexus may be found absent
physical presence ascribable to a taxpayer." Id. at 212. For example, a 2004 decision
rendered by the Louisiana Court of Appeals limited its analysis to due process. Sec'y, Dep't
of Revenue v. GAP (Apparel), Inc., 886 So. 2d 459, 461 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that
"[ilf a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in
the forum state, it may subject itself to the state's personal jurisdiction even if it has no
physical presence in the state").
150 See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (stating that both Due Process
and Commerce Clauses impose limits on states taxing interstate companies); Lanco, 21 N.J.
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Commerce Clause to require tangible property or physical presence
within a state for the establishment of a substantial nexus,15 1 using
the business situs of intellectual property as the required link
between a state and the foreign holder of intellectual property rights
152
cannot withstand constitutional muster.
In addition, the business situs theory is incongruous, as illustrated in the next hypothetical. Imagine that Grisham decides to
offer a few autographed copies of his books for sale via telephone.
Now, Grisham has become a remote seller of those limited copies.
Under the Quill mandate, a state cannot impose sale or use taxes on
Grisham-the remote seller-due to the lack of a substantial nexus
between the state and Grisham. If there is no substantial nexus
under the Commerce Clause for use and sales taxes, how could a
substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause be present for state
income taxes? It would be incongruous to assert that there is
nevertheless a substantial nexus between the state and Grisham for
state taxation of royalty payments that Grisham receives based on
the volume of his books sold at retailers across the state and yet no
substantial nexus between the state and Grisham for sales or use
53
taxes. 1

Tax at 204 ("State taxation of entities engaged in interstate commerce must comport with the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution.").
'"
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (noting that Court, on several occasions, has affirmed sharp
distinction between mail-order sellers with physical presence in taxing state and those who
do no more than communicate with customers in state by mail or common carrier as part of
general interstate business). The Court has also expressed " 'doubt that termination of an
interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to tax a
call.'" Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989)).
..
2 The Quill Court adopted a bright-line approach in imposing the physical presence test
for sales and use tax because such an approach "encourages settled expectations and, in doing
so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals." Id. at 316. The Court noted that
Congress adopted a similar approach for state taxation of net income. Id. at 316 n.9 ("It is
worth noting that Congress has, at least on one occasion, followed a similar approach in its
regulation of state taxation.... Congress enacted Pub. L. 86-272, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381[,
which forbids states from imposing] a net income tax on any person if that person's 'only
business activities within such State [involve] the solicitation of orders [approved] outside the
State [and] filled... outside the State.' ").
15 See Cerro Copper Prods., Inc. v. State, No. F. 94-444, 1995 WL 800114, at *3 (Ala. Dep't
Rev. Dec. 11, 1995) ("If the Taxpayer does not have sufficient nexus with Alabama for sales
and use tax purposes, which it clearly does not have under Quill, then it is incongruous that
the Taxpayer would have 'substantial nexus' to be subject to Alabama's franchise tax.").
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VI. BALANCING INTERESTS IN HOLDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

As intellectual property assets continue to be valuable corporate
assets, holders of such assets will seek ways to legitimately
minimize tax burdens in their quest to maximize overall corporate
revenue and profit. 54 States that want to extend their taxing power
to reach IP holding companies should first have some understanding
of the nature of intellectual property rights.' 5 Sound tax policies
require considering the interests of intellectual property rights
holders and then balancing those interests with local taxation.
A. CORPOREAL NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INFRINGEMENTS,
AND REMEDIES
56
Intellectual property is a peculiar form of intangible property.'
One cannot touch and feel a trademark, copyright, trade secret, or
patent, and yet trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and patents
seem to be everywhere.' 57 A trademark affixed to a tangible product
is present wherever the product is shipped, offered for sale, and
consumed.' 8 A copyright is intangible, yet has a presence wherever

" See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 219 (noting that "perhaps the decisive reason .. . for placing
ownership of intangibles in a separate corporation... is the avoidance of taxation").
" The intellectual property rights holder understands its valuable intellectual property
assets and the intangible nature of the rights embodied in the physical copies. Furthermore,
the intellectual property rights holder will search different jurisdictions for favorable taxation
results before conducting its business. That leaves the taxing authority "bound where the
taxpayer has chosen shrewdly." Id.
' See Carole R. Klein et al., Intellectual PropertyIssues, 1431 PLICORP 703, 708 (2004)
("Although possession of tangible assets provides some evidence (if no adverse claims are
made) of ownership, possession of many intangible assets is nearly meaningless as an
indicator ofownership because a number of people can possess the same intellectual property
in different ways and not necessarily have an ownership interest.").
157 See Howard Siegel & Linda A. Newmark, Music Publishing,782 PLU/PAT 855, 1078
(2004) ("[1]ntellectual property, practically speaking, means that it is intangible, something
that can not be touched.").
158 According to the federal trademark statute, a trademark is deemed to be used in
commerce
(1) on goods when(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto,
or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then
on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce[]
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a tangible copy of the copyrighted work is transported and used.1 59
A trade secret or a patent is embodied in the tangible, movable, and
physical machinery, process, product, or method.16 °
Where is the situs of a trademark, copyright, trade secret, or
patent? According to trade secret law, trade secrets have a fictional
situs where the trade secret owner resides.1 6' Further, trade secrets
have a situs in their state of origin.'6 2 Indeed, numerous courts
have held that with respect to intellectual property protected under
state law, the holder's state residence is the situs of the intellectual
property interests. 63
Federal trademarks, copyrights, and patents, on the other hand,
are not protected under state law;'6 4 they are protected under

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
"' The copyright of a work of authorship is present in the sense that the copyright is fixed
in the tangible object such as a book or a CD ROM. See Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d
670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that computer program may be copyrightable as intangible
intellectual property, but once it is copied onto floppy disc it becomes tangible physical good);
Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the
Form(Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMP. & H. TECH. L.J.
991, 995-96 (2004) (stating that copyright law separates work of authorship-an intangible
intellectual creation in which copyright subsists-from tangible object in which work is fixed).
160 E.g., Tarek N. Fahmi, IP Due Diligence: Methodologies and Practices,779 PLI/PAT
841, 897 (2004) (describing process patents embodied in products); Corey B. Blake, Note,
Ghost of the Past: Does the USPTO's Scientific and Technical BackgroundRequirement Still
Make Sense?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 735, 764 (2004) (describing method patents embodied in
computer program).
'6' See MELVIN F. JONGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 4:0311] (1988) (describing choice of law
in trade secrets cases).
162 See Harry Miller Co. v. Carr Chem Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 295, 298 n.1 (E.D. Penn. 1998)
(distinguishing proper venue for trade secret actions as opposed to trademark actions).
16 E.g., Paolino v. Channel Home Ctrs., 668 F.2d 721, 724 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that
"[s]ince intellectual property cannot have a physical situs the law of the state of residence of
the person who initially developed and protected the secret appears to be the obvious starting
point for its protection"). When a nonresident interferes with intellectual property, it is
foreseeable that the state creator would reach out through its courts to protect those rights
it bestowed upon its citizens. Anderson v. Century Prods. Co., 943 F. Supp. 137, 144 (D.N.H.
1996).
16 Trademarks are protected under both state and federal law. Rachel Clark Hughey,
The Impact of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark Protection of Other Marks, 14
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327, 336 (2004). Since the federal protection for
trademarks is significantly broader than state protections, most trademark owners today seek
federal protection for their trademarks. See id. (noting benefits provided federally registered
trademark); Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad
Faith inAwardingan Accounting of Defendant'sProfits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863,866-73
(2002) (discussing expansion of federal trademark protection); Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive
Trademarksand the FirstAmendment,70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1124 (2003) (discussing several
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federal law.'6 5 Trademarks, copyrights, and patents, therefore, do
not have situs in their state of origin; they instead have no real
situs, 166 apart from the domicile of the holder. 167 In other words, the
property resides is the situs
state in which the owner of intellectual
61
interest.
property
of the intangible
In infringement jurisprudence, however, the situs of the injury in
patent infringement actions is the location, or locations, where the
169
infringing activity directly impacts the interests of the patentee.
This is so because the "[e conomic loss occurs to the patent holder at
the place where the infringing sale is made because the patent
owner loses business there."1 7 ° Likewise, in trademark and
copyright infringement cases the situs of the infringement is the
place where the infringing sales are made.' 7 ' Because the focus in
infringement actions is on long-arm jurisdiction over the defendant,
neither a plaintiffs residence nor a plaintiffs contacts with the

benefits provided under federal law).
'"
Federal protection for trademarks is codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1129, copyrights in
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-121, and patents in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105. See also LateefMtima, Tasini and
Its Progeny: The New Exclusive Right or FairUse on the Electronic PublishingFrontier?,14
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 369, 396-97 (2004) (discussing source of copyright
law and its purpose).
" See Harry Miller Co., 5 F. Supp. 21 at 298 n. 1 (distinguishing patents, copyrights, and
trademarks from trade secrets).
167 Educ. Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 631 F. Supp. 550, 564 (D.N.J. 1986) ("[Blecause both
patents and trade secrets would be deemed to have fictional situs at the residence of their
owners, the cause of action arose in the plaintiffs home state."); London Film Prods. Ltd. v.
Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 49 n.4 (D.N.J. 1984) (citing
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[c] (1982) (noting that copyright is
intangible incorporeal right with no situs apart from proprietor's domicile).
16 Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(rejecting previous decision holding that situs of patent infringement injury is situs of
intangible property interest, i.e., where owner resides).
169 Id. at 1571.
170 Id. The court determined that the best methodology for defining the legal situs of an
injury under patent law was to locate the place of sale of the infringing good. Id. The court
reasoned:
Analysis of long-arm jurisdiction has its focus on the conduct of the
defendant. Plaintiffs contacts with the forum-such as where the
plaintiffresides-as a general proposition are not considered a determinative consideration. Additionally, a focus on the place where the infringing
sales are made is consistent with other areas of intellectual property
law-it brings patent infringement actions into line with the rule applied
in trademark and copyright cases.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
171 Id. at 1572.
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forum state are considered determinative factors. Therefore, the
fictional presence of intellectual property does not have any
jurisdictional significance in a long-arm jurisdictional analysis.'72
The focus instead is on the place of the infringing harm and on the
conduct of the defendants.173

Accordingly, a holder of a trademark, copyright, or patent may
bring an infringement action against potential defendants in any
federal district court where the infringing conduct occurs as long as
the federal district court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the forum state's long-arm jurisdiction. 174 A successful
claimant then can enjoy the remedies available, thereby enjoining
the infringing conduct nationwide.7 5 From the infringement and
remedies perspective, intellectual property rights seem to be
everywhere. Intellectual property rights holders seem to benefit
from every state where the products and services associated with
the rights reside.
Does it then follow that every state can tax one of the benefits,
such as income derived from intellectual property rights, because
172 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted, however, that "intangible property has no actual

situs," and the fictional presence accorded such property by law "can have no jurisdictional
significance." Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980).
173 E.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co., 21 F.3d at 1572 (holding defendants subject to personal
jurisdiction under Virginia's long-arm statute). The finding for such situs in an infringement
case analysis of long-arm jurisdiction has its focus on the conduct of the defendant. A
plaintiff's contacts with the forum, such as where the plaintiff resides, as a general
proposition are not considered a determinative consideration. Id. at 1571-72.
174 See N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that situs of patent infringement occurs where offending act is committed).
In trademark infringement actions, two circuits have stated that the claim arises at the place
of the "passing off," which is "where the deceived customer buys the defendant's product in
the belief that he is buying the plaintiffs." Tefal, S.A. v. Prods. Int'l Co., 529 F.2d 495, 496
n.1 (3d Cir. 1976) ("It is undisputed that a cause of action for trademark infringement arises
where the passing off occurs."); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); see also Beverly Hills Fan Co., 21 F.3d at 1570 ("[A]
focus on the place where the infringing sales are made is consistent with other areas of
intellectual property law-it brings patent infringement actions into line with the rule applied
in trademark and copyright cases.").
17' See Bebe Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Int'l, 313 F.3d 1056, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 2002)
(affirming lower court's nationwide injunction in case where plaintiffs clothing store made
sufficient showing that injunction should be issued against competitor); 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26:17 at 26-27 (4th ed.
2003) (noting that federal trademark registration presumptively creates nationwide
protection and federal trademark law under Lanham Act permits injunction against party
when that party's use of similar mark is likely to cause confusion).
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the situs for infringement of intellectual property rights seems to
reside in any state where the infringing conduct occurs? 76 The
answer is a resounding "No." The jurisdictional focus in an
infringement action involving intellectual property is the connection
between the infringing defendant and the forum, not the physical,
substantial nexus between the intellectual property holder and the
forum. Further, the in personam jurisdictional inquiry is a due
Thus, whether
process analysis, not a Commerce Clause inquiry.'
a particular forum has jurisdiction over an infringer may not
establish that the forum also has a substantial nexus with the
intellectual property owner. 7 8 Therefore, the fact that an out-ofstate holder of intellectual property can petition the courts sitting
in a particular state to protect its intellectual property rights in
infringement cases does not mean that the state has a substantial
nexus with the holder for state tax purposes.' 7 9

"1 This argument was advanced by the dissenting opinion in Acme Royalty Co. v. Dir.of
Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Mo. 2002) ("Missouri not only creates a marketplace for these
products, including their licenses, but also affords legal protections to these 'taxpayers.' For
instance if a company were to sell 'Gore-Tex' products or 'Acme' bricks in Missouri without
licenses from these 'taxpayers,' there is no doubt that these 'taxpayers' could use Missouri
courts to enforce their rights to the intellectual property.").
177 See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (emphasizing that state due
process analysis was inquiry in cases addressing in personam and in rem jurisdiction). The
Quill Court quoted the explanation the Court provided in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985), to illustrate that the Due Process Clause, not the Commerce Clause, was
the appropriate jurisdictional analysis. The Quill Court stated:
Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because
the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although
territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's
affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit
there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence
within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial
actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another
State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.
Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 476).
178 See Quill, 504 U.S. 305-09 (affirming that state may establish sufficient nexus under
Due Process Clause, but fail to establish physical, substantial nexus under Commerce
Clause).
179 See Acme, 96 S.W.3d at 79-80 (Wolff, J., dissenting) (expressing frustration that while
owners of intellectual property rights enjoy state benefits, including protection from courts,
states cannot tax income produced by intellectual property assets).

1190

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1155

B. HOLDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OR A QUEST FOR TAX AVOIDANCE?

Companies with large intellectual property assets in their
portfolios have business as well as tax reasons to establish subsidiaries for holding intellectual property assets. i 0 These business
reasons have compelling rationales that should not be ignored by
taxing authorities and courts. 81' The efficiency of having centralized
control of intellectual property assets is paramount.'8 2 The corporation with such control gains knowledge about the current value of its
intellectual property assets, can decide which direction the corporation should chart with those assets, may expand its market through
licensing certain intellectual property rights, and may develop new
alliances or partnerships by using its intellectual property assets in
joint-venture or cobranding arrangements.' 3 With centralized
management of intellectual property assets, the corporation has the
information necessary to decide whether it should increase holdings
in a certain area of intellectual property rights. It also understands
which intellectual property assets are valuable and subsequently
invests or divests in certain intellectual property assets over
others.8 4 Moreover, the centralized management of intellectual
property assets provides a platform for comprehensive monitoring,
protection, and enforcement of intellectual property rights.8 5 This
minimizes the risks of having those rights expire due to administra-

18o See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Mass. 2002)
(holding that evidence supported conclusion that transfer and license-back of intellectual
property between parent and wholly owned subsidiary were for economic substance and
business purposes).
181 Id. at 517 (assessing transactions between parent and subsidiary in broader context
of operation of resultant businesses and concluding that transfer and licensing-back of
trademarks were for substantial reasons beyond tax benefits).
182 Id. at 518 (noting that creation of IP holding companies to hold various trademarks
have "legal, practical, and economic effects" on parent company as well as result in "new,
viable business enterprises").
183 See id. (noting that IP holding companies with exclusive control of intellectual property
had power to license assets to parent company and third-party companies).
184 See id. (stating that IP holding companies assumed and paid expenses of maintaining
and defending their trademark assets).
18 See id. at 517 (stating that IP holding companies "incurred and paid substantial
liabilities to unrelated third parties and [the parent company] to maintain, manage, and
defend the marks").
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tive errors, such as failing to renew intellectual property registrations or paying fees to appropriate governmental agencies. Also, it
allows the corporation to initiate timely and appropriate action to
deter the infringement of intellectual property assets and prevent
losses of certain intellectual property rights through abandonment
or through genericide via unpoliced use by a third party.-" 6 Further,
the IP holding company has control over royalty payments and
discretion to invest them for future earnings and significant
These business reasons should not be
additional income."1
disregarded by states that think all IP holding companies are
formed solely for tax avoidance purposes.
Even if the formation of an IP holding company is for tax
Utilizing legitiavoidance purposes, such goals are not illegal.'
mate means to minimize taxation is the prerogative of any entity
that is doing business and facing competition in the marketplace. 8 9
As long as there are jurisdictions that do not tax royalty income,

18' See id. (noting that "[l]egal title and physical possession of the marks passed from

Sherwin-Williams to the subsidiaries, as did the benefits and burdens of owning the marks").
117 See id. at 513 (stating that revenue earned by IP holding companies, including
proceeds from royalty payments made by parent company, "was not returned to [the parent
company] as a dividend but, rather, was retained and invested as part of their ongoing
business operations, earning significant additional income").
1
Id. at 513-14 ("There is no rule against taking advantage of opportunities created by
[the Legislature or revenue service] for beating taxes." (quoting Yosha v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 861 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1988)). Further, the transfer and license-back
transaction "does not lose its [tax] immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or,
if one chooses, evade, taxation." Id. at 514.
18. Therefore, the subjective motives that a business entity possesses when it creates an
IP holding company do not serve as a basis for disregarding the transaction because the "tax
system is a rule-based system, objective in nature, that places principal importance on what
taxpayers do and the economic consequences attached to those actions, not on what may have
subjectively motivated them to act in the first place." Id. Indeed, the court explained:
[The parent company], on initially going into business, could have
organized itself in such a way that its intangible assets (e.g., its marks)
were held in a corporation separate from the corporations holding its
production facilities and sales operations; the corporation owning the
marks could have licensed those marks to its sister corporations; and this
arrangement would have been respected by taxing authorities even if the
structure were motivated entirely by a desire to minimize [the parent
company's] over-all tax burdens. Although motivated by tax considerations, such a structure would not have been an uncommon way of doing
business nor an artificial construct whose only possible effect was the
avoidance of taxes.
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individuals or corporations will form wholly owned subsidiary
companies to hold intellectual property assets in such jurisdictions.
As long as there are nonuniform tax laws and regulations among the
states, the search for a better jurisdiction to minimize the state tax
burden will continue. Each state has its own power to decide how
it can reach the royalty income received by IP holding companies, as
long as that reach is within constitutional confines. 9 °
Instead of zealously pursuing IP holding companies and encountering myriad problems, states may consider different approaches
that could strike a balance between the states' interests and those
of intellectual property rights holders. For example, instead of
seeking out IP holding companies, states should determine whether
to allow in-state operating companies that use the intellectual
property rights pursuant to the license arrangement to deduct the
royalty amounts paid to IP holding companies. 9 ' If there is no
direct relationship, such as parent-subsidiary, between the
operating company and the IP holding company, the deduction is
permissible because the license arrangement is for business reasons
as long as the rate is at arm's length.'92 If the arrangement between
the IP holding company and the operating company is a sham
because it lacks business and economic substance, the deduction is
impermissible.' 9 ' Evidence of a sham arrangement may include the
19 See Christina R. Edson, Quill's ConstitutionalJurisprudenceand Tax Nexus Standards
in an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 895 (1996) (stating that state taxing
power is limited by Due Process Clause and interstate commerce concerns under Commerce
Clause).
11 This approach requires a fact-intensive inquiry as employed by a few jurisdictions such
as Massachusetts. See Syms Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 765 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Mass. 2002)
(stating that whether creation of IP holding company and transfer and license-back
arrangement constitutes sham is primarily factual inquiry, in which taxpayer bears burden
of proof in abatement process).
" See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504, 504 (Mass. 2002)
(allowing deduction of royalty payments by parent company to IP holding company); Syms,
765 N.E.2d at 760 (denying deduction under sham transaction doctrine and 'ordinary and
necessary expenses" doctrine); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-4.4 (West 2002) (disallowing
deductions for royalty payments made to related entity for use of intangible property).
193 See Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 760 (affirming board's denial of deduction of royalty payments
made by parent company because royalty payments were not ordinary and necessary business
expense). The court in Syms adopted the board's findings that:
[Tihe value of the marks had been created entirely by [the parent
company], and, even after their transfer and the payment ofthe royalties,
[the parent company] continued to pay the expenses associated with
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parent company holding majority control of the stock in an IP
holding company, the relatively unchanged status of the intellectual
property rights management and control before and after the
transfer and license-back relationship, and the lack of a coherent
behind the establishment of the IP holding
business purpose
94
company.1
Furthermore, instead of the deduction allowance approach, states
may require combined reporting by all corporate components of an
enterprise engaged in a unitary business conducted in part within
the taxing state. 195 Under the combined reporting approach, states
must establish that there is a unitary business between the parent
196
company and its subsidiaries, including the IP holding company.
The taxing authority reaches the apportioned royalty income by
directing its attention to the operating company within the state.

owning them, including the legal expenses incurred in maintaining them.
It concluded that, in such circumstances, [the parent company's] royalty
payments to [the IP holding company] for the use of the marks was
unnecessary. In effect, [the parent company] was paying twice for their
use.
Id.
'
See id. at 762 (noting that business operations of parent corporation did not change
after transfer and license-back of marks to IP holding company where parent company
continued to maintain and protect goodwill and value of trademarks, paid for all attorney fees
associated with protection and enforcement of trademarks along with advertising expenditures, continued to choose which products would be sold under marks, and oversaw quality
control of those products).
...Jurisdictions that have adopted such an approach include Illinois, New York, and
Oregon. See, e.g., Automatic Data Processing v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 729 N.E.2d 897, 903
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting that combined reporting is favored over separate reporting for
state income tax purposes because combined reporting "is much less subject to manipulation
by taxpayers than is separate reporting"); In re Burnham Corp., No. 814531, 1997 WL 413931,
*13-*15 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 10, 1997) (interpreting New York statutes and regulations
concerning combined tax reporting in case involving Delaware IP holding company and its
parent company); Nabisco Brands, Inc. & Affiliates v. Dep't of Rev., No. TC-MD 010109A,
2003 WL 21246425, *1 (Or. T.C. Magis. Div. Apr. 3, 2003) (discussing Oregon statutes on
combined tax reporting for unitary business).
19 The unitary business principle establishes the constitutional basis for a state to reach
the apportioned income of an out-of-state company and include such income with an in-state
company. See Citizens Utils. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 488 N.E.2d 984,987 (Ill. 1986) (stating
that various entities deemed to constitute single business enterprise are combined into
"unitary business group," which is treated as single taxpayer); Jerome B. Libin & Timothy
H. Gillis, It's a Small World After All: The Intersection of Tax Jurisdictionat International,
National, and Subnational Levels, 38 GA. L. REV. 197, 273 (2003) ("The unitary business
principle simply establishes the constitutional basis for a state to include out-of-state income
in an in-state taxpayer's tax base subject to apportionment.").
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This is possible because the transactions between the operating
company and the IP holding company should not be acknowledged
since they have no economic substance, serve no legitimate business
purpose, fail to reflect an arm's length charge, and were formed
solely as a means to avoid taxation.'9 7
In the proposed approaches, though the taxing authority does not
directly pursue the out-of-state IP holding company, the result is the
same: Apportioned royalty income is subject to state taxation.' 98
These approaches, however, limit a state's reach to royalty income
when the relationship between the operating company and the IP
holding company is not a sham. 9 9 States cannot tax the royalty
income when the IP holding company is a legitimately separate
business entity."0
VII. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property will continue to enjoy its status as a
valuable corporate asset in the economy. As enormous amounts of
financial resources are devoted to the creation, protection, and
enforcement of trademarks, copyrights, patents, and trade secrets,
holders of such property will continue to look for ways to maximize
the return from their valuable intellectual property. Many holders
of such property have successfully devised and utilized the IP
holding company model as a means of avoiding state taxation. Some
state taxing authorities have desperately attempted to reach the
handsome royalty "nowhere" income. As long as the ambiguity
197 See Maria T. Jones et al., 2002-2003 Survey of New York Law State and Local

Taxation, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1379, 1388-94 (2004) (analyzing combined tax report method
applied by New York in taxing trademark holding company).
198 See Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 219 (N.J. Tax Ct. Oct. 23,
2003) (stating that tax avoidance can be addressed by combined reporting or disallowance of
deduction for royalty payments).
...See Syms Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 765 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Mass. 2002) (holding that
evidence sufficiently supports finding that assignment and license-back arrangement between
parent company and Delaware IP holding company was sham and royalty payments resulted
from sham transaction); In re Burnham, No. 814531, 1997 WL 413931, at *14 (N.Y. Div. of
Tax App. July 10, 1997) (finding that taxing authority failed to demonstrate that relationship
of New York petitioner with its affiliated Delaware IP holding companies was distortive).
2"0 See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Syl, Inc., 825 A.2d 399, 401 (Md. 2003) (affirming
Comptroller's finding that Delaware IP holding company was phantom company that lacked
any economic substance).
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2 1
caused by Quill, the lack of response from Congress, 0 and the
nonuniform state taxing schemes remain the status quo, corporations with large intellectual property portfolios and state taxing
authorities will continue to face the costly uncertainties associated
with the constitutionally permissible reach of state taxing power to
IP holding companies. It is time for a bright-line rule in this
pressing area of the law.

"' Even the Quill Court has suggested that Congress, with its commerce power, is the
appropriate branch to address state taxation and the burden on interstate commerce. Quill
Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (inviting Congress to address state taxation
power in area involving multistate and interstate commerce because "Congress has the power
to protect interstate commerce from intolerable or even undesirable burdens").

